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ABSTRACT
Rawls’s contractualist approach to justice is well known for its 
adoption of ideal theory. This approach starts by setting out the 
political goal or ideal and leaves it to non-ideal or partial compli-
ance theory to map out how to get there. However, Rawls’s use of 
ideal theory has been criticized by Sen from the right and by 
Mouffe from the left. We critically address these concerns in the 
context of developing a Rawlsian approach to climate justice. 
While the importance of non-ideal theory for climate justice is 
increasingly being understood, its strategic and institutional 
importance for a Rawlsian approach needs further elaboration. 
We focus on the role of the Kantian conception of the reasonable 
and rational powers of persons in Rawls’s work and show how this 
helps us to develop a partial compliance theory that focuses on 
the importance of institutions and strategic political action for 
achieving climate justice.
Through his life’s work, John Rawls drew on the social contract tradition to offer concep-
tions of justice, first for reasonably well-off constitutional democracies, and later, more 
briefly, for the international community of peoples. He characterized his task as ideal 
theory, identifying principles of justice for what he called the basic structure of society and 
then for a law of peoples to govern international relations. Ideal theory, he used to say, 
“always comes first.” It offers a vision, a target to guide action; working out how to get 
there and what to prioritize falls to non-ideal theory, or to what Rawls sometimes called 
partial compliance theory.
As the leading political philosopher of the 20th century, Rawls’s conception and use 
of ideal theory has inspired an enormous critical literature. One branch assesses, 
critiques, and defends the concept of ideal theory, its role within Rawls’s project, its 
wider applications, and the non-ideal theory that complements it. For another branch, 
Rawls’s configuration of his political philosophy as ideal theory serves as a basis for 
attacking his overall project, for example, by Sen from the right and by Mouffe from the 
left. In this paper we aim to deepen the conception of ideal theory by grounding it 
explicitly in the Kantian conception of moral personality that underlies much of Rawls’s 
work, and, on this basis, to develop foundations for a more general critical yet still 
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Rawlsian political theory that addresses some of the concerns of his more systematic 
critics. While the importance of non-ideal theory for climate justice is increasingly being 
understood,1 its strategic and institutional importance for a Rawlsian approach needs 
further elaboration.
For Rawls, drawing on Kant, moral personality is based on two fundamental 
powers or capacities, described as the reasonable and the rational. The reasonable 
is associated with conceptions of right and is cognitively expressed in principles; and 
the rational involves conceptions of the good, expressed in interests.2 For Kant, 
“personality” is limited to the capacity to regard oneself as subject to “pure practical 
laws given by his own reason,”3 which is roughly equivalent to Rawls’s category of 
the reasonable. However, Kant’s broader conception of practical reason goes beyond 
the categorical imperatives of pure practical reason (moral rationality), to also include 
the rational principles of willing the means to one’s end (instrumental rationality), 
and the practical necessity of those ends that make up one’s conception of happi-
ness (prudential rationality).4 The last of these maps on to Rawls’s category of the 
rational. According to Rawls, moral doctrines and conceptions of justice can be 
divided between those that aim to maximize the good or to achieve a single highest 
good, including Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and the classical utilitarians, 
Bentham, Edgeworth, and Sidgwick, and those that focus on rights, duties, and 
obligations, including Locke, Hume, Leibniz, and Kant.5 Rawls and Kant (in his 
moral philosophy) are mostly engaged in ideal theory, that is, in trying to articulate, 
and so perhaps to help the reader to adopt, valid moral principles. Both place the 
right before the good, taking it that principles should constrain interests absolutely. 
The implication of this theory is that anyone’s moral personality can be described in 
terms of their principles and interests, regardless of how valid their principles may be 
(that is, whether they really come from their own pure practical reason or are instead 
the result of circumstances, ideology, or error) or how far those principles actually 
constrain their interests.
It is characteristic of Kant’s philosophy that he understands human experience to 
depend both on capacities of the mind and on a reality external to the person. He divides 
reason into two parts, practical and theoretical; as Rawls explains, “Following Kant’s way of 
making the distinction, we say: practical reason is concerned with the production of 
objects according to a conception of those objects – for example, the conception of 
a just constitutional regime taken as the aim of political endeavor – while theoretical 
reason is concerned with the knowledge of given objects.”6 For Kant, practical reason, 
which informs his account of moral and political philosophy, starts from a conception of 
1E.g., Eric Brandstedt, “Non-Ideal Climate Justice,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22, no. 2 
(2017): 221–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2017.1334439.
2John Rawls, Political Liberalism [PL] (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 48–54.
3KpV, 5:87; Kant’s works are cited by the volume and page number of the standard Academy edition. Title abbreviations 
for Kant’s work come the Kant-Studien list of sigla. English translations are from the Cambridge Edition of Kant’s works.
4Kant, GMS, 4:415–16; see Onora O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
5John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 360; John Rawls, 
Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Harman, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 1–9.
6Rawls, Political Liberalism, 93.
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the mind which obligates us to make the world conform to its rational ideals, while 
theoretical reason, including, for example, the natural sciences, starts from the form that 
the mind imposes on one’s experience of the external world beyond it.
To see the implications of this model of reason for critical social theory, we need to 
bring together two of its features. First, following from Rawls’s conception of ideal theory, 
any critical social theory must include a conception of a social ideal, which for Kant can 
serve as an object of a person’s practical reason. Second, the realization of this ideal and 
the challenges that must be overcome to achieve it normally depend largely on config-
urations of principles and interests of particular persons. Most simply put, the tasks for 
persons who aim to promote an ideal are to create conditions that cause persons who 
hold competing principles and interests to change their principles and adopt this ideal, or 
to replace them in relevant social positions with persons who hold the relevant ideal, or 
else to hope that self-interest will force them eventually toward the just solution (as Kant 
thinks it does with the problem of establishing a state).7
Theorists who aim to articulate ideals or to correct theoretical reason normally write in 
terms of a single, unified field of reason and truth, as though it is always shared by all 
persons. It is clear, however, that each person has their own instantiations of practical and 
theoretical reason that not only guide their actions but also condition their experience. 
Our concepts condition not only the aims and strategies we may adopt but also our 
perception of the external world. According to Kant, we tend to impose conceptions of 
causality onto experience to understand it, but we may well do so in ways that are 
inconsistent with better grounded, more valid exercises of theoretical or practical reason. 
Daily life can be characterized in terms of the ongoing construction of our social world, 
reaffirming or altering principles and interests, based in part on (modifiable) conceptions 
of the external world constructed by our theoretical reason.
The transition from moral theory to social analysis requires a theory of institutions. 
When principles are widely shared and acknowledged we call them norms, and some 
norms are codified into law. Centeno, Kohli and Yashar argue that the state is a form of 
domination that “can be used for all different kinds of ends (for good and for bad). Thus, 
politics is central to any explanation of state performance,” determining collective ima-
ginaries of what is, what is good, and what can be, shaping goals and strategies, inter-
acting with structural constraints but not reducible to them.8 A theory of institutions of 
course involves its own moral theory, for example, how hiring by merit tends to induce 
a desire to perform well while hiring by loyalty generates incentives to support the patron.
To see how the Rawlsian/Kantian conception of moral personality can serve a transition 
from Rawls’s theory of justice to a general critical theory, we can employ it in developing 
foundations for a critical theory of climate justice. To generate an ideal of climate justice, we 
start from Rawls’s original position (OP). A core issue to resolve when applying Rawls’s 
theory of justice to climate change is who the parties to the relevant OP are understood to 
be. In the context of the state in Theory of Justice, Rawls’s focus is on individuals within 
a state forming a contract (technically, “heads of families”).9 In the global context, where 
issues of climate change clearly belong, Rawls in The Law of Peoples takes the existence of 
7Kant, ZeF, 8:366.
8Miguel Angel Centeno, Atul Kohli, and Deborah J. Yashar, “Conclusion,” in ed. Miguel Centeno, Atul Kohli, and Deborah 
J. Yashar with Dinsha Mistree, States in the Developing World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 419–420.
9John Rawls, A Theory of Justice [TJ], Revised Edition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, 1999), 111.
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nation states for granted as the basic unit of analysis and focuses on agreement between 
states (technically, between representatives of “liberal” and “decent” peoples). This has been 
criticized from a cosmopolitan perspective as failing to take into account individuals, 
especially those in “burdened societies” who are excluded from contract negotiations and 
minorities not represented well by their state.10 As we have argued previously, and argue 
further below, in the context of climate justice the only way to properly take into account 
the interests of the victims of climate change is to adopt an OP constituted by “representa-
tives of individuals,” not peoples. In such an OP, the individuals do not know “whether they 
are rich or poor, or male or female, they also do not know in what country they reside or . . . 
in what period of time, from now through the indefinite future.”11 Crucially, this approach 
prioritizes the interests of individuals in having a decent life and securing their basic rights 
and liberties over the interest of states (or peoples) in being left alone to govern themselves. 
Of course, there are also further issues that a more complete account of climate justice 
needs to consider, such as the role of population and the use of geoengineering. As they are 
tangential to our main concern here, we can leave these further issues aside.12
From the climate change OP, considering challenges presented by climate change 
allows us to generate a rough ideal of the social institutions needed to realize climate 
justice, as we illustrate below. A corollary, one could say, of the Kantian conception of 
moral personality, based on insights from Kant’s theory of history13 prominently devel-
oped by Marx, is that present institutions are the outcome of prior social struggle or 
“antagonism in society,”14 reflecting earlier configurations of principles and interests. 
A first step in developing a strategy for climate justice, therefore, is to map not only 
current institutions, but also configurations of principles and interests that they reflect 
among relevant populations in terms that clarify the distance from the present world to 
a world of climate justice. Strategy for climate justice, therefore, involves not simply the 
positive steps needed to build appropriate institutions, but also how to support transi-
tions to appropriate principles and how to overcome opposition from people and 
institutions with competing principles and interests.
Climate change is due to emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gasses 
that increase the heat that Earth’s atmosphere retains from the sun.15 Anthropogenic CO2 
emissions have increased more or less continuously since the advent of the industrial revolu-
tion, and about half of the CO2 remains in the atmosphere at least for hundreds of years. From 
an ethical perspective, CO2 emissions are best understood as externalities from privately 
profitable activities. Firms and consumers benefit from the polluting activity, and most of the 
resulting harms are imposed on people in other countries and in future times. As effects of 
CO2 emissions are global, the contemporary overall framework for managing climate change 
is worked out at the international level through negotiations among national governments at 
meetings of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
10E.g., Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective” in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, ed. 
Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2019), 525–539.
11Paul Clements, “Rawlsian Ethics of Climate Change,” Critical Criminology 23, no. 4 (2015): 461–471, 463.
12But for a general overview see Simon Caney, “Climate Justice” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta, (Summer 2020 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/justice-climate/.
13E.g., Kant, IaG 8:20–21.
14Ibid., 20.
15For simplicity we subsequently refer only to CO2 as including the other greenhouse gasses would not change the 
analysis.
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Climate change justice, therefore, needs to address governments as well as individual persons, 
and besides addressing rights and obligations, it must also take into account governments’ 
political interests and constraints.
As noted above, to develop a Rawlsian conception of climate justice, we first need to work 
out an appropriate formulation for the OP. In TJ, where Rawls proposes principles of justice for 
a liberal society, hypothetical agents in the OP represent persons in that society.16 In The Law 
of Peoples, however, they represent entire liberal peoples, identifying principles to govern 
their relations with other, liberal and non-liberal peoples.17 In both cases, consistent with 
justice as fairness (as Rawls calls his approach), the agents stand behind a “veil of ignorance,” 
not knowing, in the first case, the person’s class position or social status, their fortune in the 
distribution of natural assets and abilities, their intelligence and strength, and such.18 In 
the second case the agents do not know the size of the people’s territory, the extent of 
their natural resources, their level of economic development, or their military strength.19 The 
first OP is designed to select “the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further 
their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental 
terms of their association,”20 and the second extends this approach to peoples.
One might think that since the overall framework for managing climate change is 
worked out between representatives of national governments, an OP for climate justice, 
like for the law of peoples, would be populated by representatives of peoples. This, as we 
note above, would be a mistake. In the community of peoples, each people is a corporate 
unit with respect to other peoples, with principles and interests bound together through 
common governance. While governments may indeed promote the interests of some 
citizens more strongly than others in international relations, this is an internal matter in 
relation to other states. The effective unit of cooperation for a people is the country 
bound by a constitution and body of law, not, say, the city or province, and as such this is 
also the appropriate unit for regulating relations among peoples. Only when a state goes 
to war other than for self-defense or severely violates the human rights of its own people 
may intervention by other states be justified.21 When it comes to climate change, how-
ever, benefits and harms from CO2 pollution are experienced first by individual persons 
and other agents (e.g., firms), as individual polluters impose harms on individual persons 
in other states. Most of the more extreme victims from climate change are likely to be 
relatively marginalized and powerless, and may even be members of what Rawls calls 
“burdened societies,” and their governments cannot be relied upon to represent their 
interests effectively in international negotiations. While relations between polluters and 
victims are mediated by governments, and nation states and other corporate units are 
independently relevant, climate justice is fundamentally a matter of relations between 
persons. For this reason, agents in the OP for climate justice, similarly to those in the OP 
for a single society, must represent individual persons. Given that CO2 pollution can harm 
persons decades and centuries hence, these future persons must also be fairly repre-
sented in the climate justice OP.
16Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 11.
17John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” [LP] (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1999), 30–33.
18Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 11.
19Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 32–33.
20Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 10.
21Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 37.
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In TJ Rawls addresses the difficult problem of justice between generations by modeling 
agents in the OP as knowing that they represent heads of families who care about their 
immediate descendants, but not knowing the present stage of civilization of the society of 
the persons they represent. The agents select an approach to savings that can apply at 
any time, and where all prior generations will also have followed this approach. This leads 
them to support a level of savings that allows for some improvement in social conditions, 
until such time as “just institutions are firmly established and all the basic liberties [are] 
effectively realized.” At this point “the net accumulation asked for [as a matter of justice] 
falls to zero,”22 although levels of “material” and “cultural” capital must be at least 
maintained going forward (while the extent to which this includes “natural” resources 
as well is a matter of debate, the “natural” world is clearly an essential foundation of the 
former).23
In the OP for climate justice, the agents are aware of threats that progress toward social 
justice may be reversed, such as from rising sea levels to the peoples of low-lying islands, 
from multiple dangers to the peoples of many low- and middle-income countries, and 
from potential breakdowns in institutions of international cooperation. As these threats 
are largely imposed by relatively wealthy people in advanced countries onto relatively 
poor people in developing countries, they lead to obligations for remediation and 
requirements for international governance not found in the OP of TJ. Following the 
procedure from TJ, the agents do not know the stage of civilization of the persons they 
represent, but if these persons happen to live in our time, at this stage of climate change, 
then these obligations and requirements obtain. Since threats from increasing atmo-
spheric CO2 face both present and future generations, the main significance of taking 
account of justice to future generations in the climate justice OP is to reinforce or 
strengthen overall imperatives to limit climate change and address its harms.
Rawls does not specify what exactly it is that his just savings principle requires to be 
saved beyond that these savings allow for continued advance toward or maintenance of 
social justice, which includes its cultural as well as material foundations. It is worth 
pointing out that besides threatening material well-being, climate change also threatens 
foundations for culture in a variety of ways, such as by changing habitats and increasing 
extinctions, and challenges the ongoing stability of just institutions insofar as these 
depend on a well-functioning environment that can support an adequate standard of 
living for all. Climate change also raises questions about justice to non-humans, given 
their essential role in maintaining and constituting a well-functioning environment, that 
TJ does not address.24 Once again, these considerations reinforce already compelling 
obligations in the climate justice OP, and they may strengthen obligations to protect 
other beings in the natural world.
From the perspective of our OP, behind the veil of ignorance, the agents are to identify 
principles for allocating rights and duties associated with climate change. These include 
rights to generate CO2 pollution and duties to reduce and to correct climate change’s 
22Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 255.
23For discussion see Ben Pontin, “The Role of ‘Previous Generations’ in the Just Savings Principle of John Rawls.” Kantian 
Review 24, no. 4 (2019): 555–71 and Stephen Gardiner, “Rawls and Climate Change” Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy 14, no. 2 (2011): 125–51.
24For critical discussion see, for example, Robert Garner, A Theory of Justice for Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013).
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harms. Since harms from climate change depend first on the total level of CO2 in the 
atmosphere, and here national governments are the effective units of responsibility, 
agents in the OP need either to determine by themselves a global budget for CO2 
emissions and allocate it across countries, or to identify fair procedures for others to do 
so. Then they need to identify principles for achieving the required emission reductions 
and for generating adequate energy from non-carbon sources. In negotiations at the 
UNFCCC, the term used for CO2 reductions is “mitigation,” and terms associated with 
reducing and correcting harms are “adaptation” and “loss and damage.”25 This categor-
ization, however, reflects the UNFCCC’s state-centric perspective. There are several ways 
in which the present, Westphalian system of nation states is problematic for climate 
justice, as we discuss below. While agents in the OP would want to limit deaths from 
climate change, beyond this the most significant harm they would aim to have actively 
managed would be from persons they might represent being displaced from their homes 
and/or livelihoods, such as due to droughts, excessive heat, or floods, and having to move 
and remake their lives in other locations. These agents must defend persons’ opportu-
nities to fully exercise the basic liberties as they pursue their conceptions of the good, and 
while these opportunities are hardly threatened by reductions in CO2 pollution (assuming 
these reductions are well managed), they are greatly threatened by the displacement of 
persons. UNFCCC negotiations, however, have generally neglected the specific needs of 
climate migrants. The Paris Agreement mentions migrants only once, in passing,26 and the 
organization set up by the UNFCCC to address loss and damage, the Warsaw International 
Mechanism, aims largely to address overall risk management and sharing technology and 
information, with little direct attention to climate migrants.27 If we take adaptation to 
involve both efforts to limit effects of climate change and efforts to limit harms other than 
displacements after they occur, the three main subjects that agents in our OP would 
address are mitigation, adaptation, and support for climate migrants.
Selecting a mitigation target involves weighing gains from activities that generate CO2 
pollution against harms from climate change, taking account of prospects for establishing 
nonpolluting energy sources. The dependence of practical on theoretical reason is 
particularly apparent as agents in the OP consider the uncertainty in projections of 
harms from climate change. Atmospheric CO2 is increasing much faster than Earth has 
experienced in the last 800,000 years, and to a level far higher, from 280 parts per million 
(ppm) in 1800, at the dawn of the industrial revolution, already to 420 ppm at this writing. 
This compares to a range from 180 to 300 ppm in this earlier period, as Earth cycled from 
ice age to ice age over periods of roughly 100,000 years, interspersed with periods 
sometimes a degree or two Celsius warmer than the present.,28,29 Earth’s extremely 
complex climate system is already in uncharted territory, and CO2 emissions continue 
to increase. Official projections of warming responses to rising levels of CO2 from the 
25United Nations, “Paris Agreement” (2015). Accessed 12 October 2021. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_ 
paris_agreement.pdf.
26Ibid., 2.
27United Nations Climate Change, “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate 
Change Impacts (WIM).” 12 October 2021. https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/loss-and- 
damage-ld/warsaw-international-mechanism-for-loss-and-damage-associated-with-climate-change-impacts-wim#eq 
-1.
28National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. “Temperature Change and Carbon Dioxide.” Accessed 12 October 
2021. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/global-warming/temperature-change.
29CO2.Earth. “Are we stabilizing yet?” Accessed 12 October 2021. https://www.co2.earth/.
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) come with wide confidence 
intervals,30 and the computer models these projections are based on are unable to 
forecast reliably major components of the climate system, such as losses of Arctic sea 
ice or of Amazon rainforest.31
With the landmark Paris Agreement of 2015, the UNFCCC set a target to limit the 
increase in global temperature to “well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and to try to 
limit the increase to 1.5°C.32 However, national commitments under the Paris Agreement 
and current (at this writing) government policies would lead to about 3°C warming by 
official estimates.33 The media commonly use phrases like, “scientists believe that keeping 
warming below 2°C will avoid the worst effects of climate change,” but this is obviously 
a convenient fudge. Increases in droughts, heat waves, more intense storms, sea level rise, 
floods, and other changes in weather patterns that we have already observed will 
certainly accelerate. Even at 1°C warming, the number of people exposed to life threaten-
ing combinations of heat and humidity at least one day per year has increased from 
97 million to 279 million. It is projected to rise to 508 million at 1.5°, 789 million at 2°, and 
1.22 billion at 3°C.34 The IPCC projects up to about a meter of sea level rise by 2100 
depending on progress in limiting CO2 emissions, but in perhaps the most sustained 
scientific critique of the IPCC, Hansen and his colleagues argue, based largely on evidence 
from the last interglacial period, that without rapid reductions in emissions sea levels 
could rise several meters in this century.35
Agents in the climate change OP acknowledge the possibility of devastating spirals of 
consequences in the natural world, for example, from accelerated sea level rise, a die-off 
of the Amazon Rainforest, or more rapid than expected release of natural carbon stores 
from permafrost, and in the social world, for example, if increasing heat, water shortages, 
and population movements exacerbate international conflicts or cause severe break-
downs in national and international institutions. Not knowing if they represent heavy 
polluters in advanced industrialized countries or people forced from their homes in 
marginalized communities of developing countries, but considering threats to the liber-
ties of victims of climate change, they find rapid reductions in CO2 emissions to be 
particularly urgent. From the UNFCCC’s establishment in 1992 it has recognized “common 
but differentiated responsibilities” between advanced countries with high current and 
cumulative emissions and developing countries with low emissions but that have yet to 
industrialize.36 Agents in the OP, too, would recognize a right to development that 
30IPCC, “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to 
the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. T.F. Stocker (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 28.
31K. Pistone, I. Eisenman and V. Ramanathan, “Radiative Heating of an Ice-Free Arctic Ocean,” Geophysical Research Letters 
46 no. 13 (2019): 7474–7480; T. E. Lovejoy and C. Nobre, “Amazon Tipping Point,” Science Advances 4, no. 2 (2018): 1; 
T. E. Lovejoy and C. Nobre, “Amazon Tipping Point: Last Chance for Action,” Science Advances 5, no. 12 (2019): 1–2.
32United Nations, Paris Agreement, 3.
33Joeri Rogelj et al., “Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well Below 2°C,” Nature 531 
(2016): 631–639; Climate Action Tracker, “Climate Action Tracker,” Accessed 1 August 2021. https://climateaction 
tracker.org/.
34Dawei Li, Jiacan Yuan and Robert E. Copp, “Escalating Global Exposure to Compound Heat-Humidity Extremes with 
Warming,” Environmental Research Letters 15, no. 6 (2020), 1.
35James Hansen, et al., “Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: Evidence from Paleoclimate Data, Climate Modeling and 
Modern Observations that 2°C Global Warming Could Be Dangerous.” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 16 (2016): 
3761–3812.
36United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), Accessed 12 October 2021. https:// 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
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conditions appropriate emissions pathways for developing countries and leads to obliga-
tions for assistance from advanced countries. Although this is a collective right, while the 
agents in the OP represent individual persons, in this case prospects for the individual’s 
exercise of liberties depend on their people’s collective advance toward social justice. As 
the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 to 2°C target probably already represents the limit of technical 
and institutional feasibility, agents in the OP would endorse it as a starting point.
The UNFCCC originally aimed to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations “at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”37 Its 
first attempt, however, the 1998 Kyoto Protocol only required emissions reductions from 
advanced countries, and due to its exclusion of developing countries the US Senate 
refused to consider it.38 Without US participation, the Kyoto Protocol failed to slow the 
increase in atmospheric CO2. Throughout UNFCCC negotiations, advanced countries have 
resisted legal responsibility for their contributions to climate change, while developing 
countries have asserted a right to development and to assistance from advanced coun-
tries. By way of compromise, the Paris Agreement has each country submit its own 
Nationally Determined Contribution toward limiting global warming and advanced coun-
tries reaffirmed their commitment to provide developing countries with $100 billion 
annual assistance for mitigation and adaptation by 2020. Although, as noted above, 
Nationally Determined Contributions collectively will lead to perhaps 3°C warming, this 
was then the strongest politically feasible agreement. As is not uncommon in the inter-
national arena, Parties to the Paris Agreement also agreed to strengthen their commit-
ments over time.
Agents in the OP would seek the most fair and effective means to avoid exceeding the 
warming target. Clearly this involves advanced countries taking responsibility for their 
CO2 pollution, however politically difficult this may be. The original round of Nationally 
Determined Contributions came with all kinds of units, timeframes, and provisos favor-
able to the committing government, and the Paris Agreement includes no sanctions for 
noncompliance or even mechanisms for consistent monitoring and reporting (although it 
sets plans for these in motion). It is clearly most effective for each country to have a CO2 
budget for which it can be held accountable, with national budgets summing to a global 
budget consistent with the warming target. In establishing budgets, agents in the OP 
would consider historic and current emissions, current capacity, and status toward an 
economy that can secure the well-being of the country’s people. All the obligations 
arising from climate change, however, for mitigation, adaptation, and to support climate 
migrants, are functionally interrelated and need morally to be considered together.
While mitigation aims to limit climate change, obligations to support adaptation and to 
assist migrants aim to limit the great harms imposed by polluters. Agents in the OP would 
find protecting the agency and dignity of individual victims and defending the capacities 
of governments and their responsiveness to their citizens to be particular priorities. No 
one can escape harms from climate change, but how debilitating their consequences39 
37Ibid., 4.
38Congress.gov, “S.Res.98 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the conditions for the United States 
becoming a signatory to any international agreement on greenhouse gas emissions under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.” Accessed 12 October 2021. https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th- 
congress/senate-resolution/98/text.
39Hence much discussion of adaptation focuses on enhancing resilience.
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are will depend on their severity and on the general capacities of the victim. While Rawls’s 
law of peoples includes a duty “to assist other peoples living under unfavorable condi-
tions that prevent their having a just or decent political or social regime,”40 the duty to 
address harms from climate change is more binding than this as it arises not merely from 
the ability to limit harms but also from some degree of responsibility for these harms. 
Ongoing failures in mitigation increase these harms and hence the burden of responsi-
bility. Natural disasters have often been attributed to fortune or to acts of God, but 
responsibility for climate change places unprecedented demands on international 
governance.
Institutions to support adaptation are already failing miserably, and while political 
backlashes against immigrants are increasing worldwide, responsibility for climate 
migrants is hardly recognized. The Global Commission on Adaptation, led by Ban Ki- 
moon, then Secretary General of the United Nations, Bill Gates of the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, and Kristalina Georgieva, then CEO of the World Bank, analyzes 
worldwide adaptation challenges in areas of food, the natural environment, water, 
cities, infrastructure, and disaster risk management. It finds that adaptation is not 
happening at “nearly the pace and scale required,”41 and calls for revolutions in under-
standing, planning, and finance. Focusing specifically on strengthening early warning 
systems, making new resilient infrastructure, improving dryland agricultural crop pro-
duction, protecting mangroves, and making water resources management more resi-
lient, it finds that $1.8 trillion invested in 2020–2030 could yield $7.1 trillion in net 
benefits.42 Global public finance for adaptation, however, was only $22 billion per year 
as of 2015–16.43
From the OP it is clear that to fulfill adaptation obligations, besides raising finance, two 
institutional imperatives have to be reconciled. First, bureaucratic capacities need to be 
developed to allocate resources rationally in a context of diffuse and uncertain risks. 
Second, resource delivery needs to be detached from the political interests not only of 
“donor” countries but also of recipient governments and designed to enhance rather than 
undermine the agency of recipient populations. International resource allocation for 
adaptation is driven not just by the physical and financial scale of risks, but by residual 
risks after local resources and institutional capacities are also taken into account. The 
greatest investments are likely to be needed where institutional capacities, particularly of 
representative governments, may be weakest. Adaptation finance today, besides being 
quantitatively inadequate, is channeled through dozens of bilateral and multilateral 
institutions and hundreds of government agencies.44 Demands for bureaucratic capacity, 
accountability, and popular participation that these organizations are already failing to 
meet will only grow stronger.
40Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 37.
41Manish Bapna, Carter Brandon, Christina Chan, Anand Patwardhan and Barney Dickson, Adapt Now: A Call for Global 




44Rachael Calleja, “How Do Development Agencies Support Climate Action?” CGD Policy Paper 207 (Washington, DC: 
Center for Global Development, 2021).
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According to UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, there were 79.5 million forcibly dis-
placed persons worldwide at the end of 2019, more than ever in recorded history, 
including 26 million international refugees and 45.7 million persons displaced within 
their home countries, so called internally displaced people or IDPs.45 The World Bank 
projects that up to 143 million people will be displaced by 2050 by slow-onset harms from 
climate change in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America, depending on 
accomplishments in mitigation and adaptation.46 Other assessments, while inevitably 
speculative, have often given 200 million climate migrants worldwide by 2050 as a best 
guess, due to rising sea level, increased droughts, and other extreme weather events. 
Institutions to support refugees and IDPs are already patently inadequate, and anti- 
immigrant sentiment has already contributed to populist nationalism that has shaken 
political systems in the United States, Europe, India, and Australia.
One of the first systematic comparisons of climate-induced and non-climate-induced 
migrants, carried out in the Korail slum in Dhaka, capital city of Bangladesh, finds climate- 
induced migrants living in relative squalor and extreme insecurity.47 Although respon-
dents from both groups arrived in Dhaka after 2006, 21% of climate-induced migrants 
were unemployed at the time of the survey compared to none of the non-climate- 
induced population, and the jobs of climate-induced migrants tended to be more 
menial.48 Households of climate-induced migrants averaged 4.2 members earning US 
$73.50 per month, compared to non-climate-induced migrant households at 3.25 mem-
bers earning $172 per month, or $0.58 per person per day compared to $1.76.49 While 
based only on recall, pre-migration income was not significantly different between the 
two groups, and all the climate-induced migrants but only 40% of the comparison group 
aspired to return to their home village.50 Adri and Simon attribute the climate-induced 
migrants’ greater vulnerability to their having become destitute within hours when their 
assets were destroyed, such as by flood or cyclone, and to their relative lack of education 
and institutional access.51 Conditions of migrants driven by slow-onset effects of climate 
change would likely fall between those of the two groups in this study.
In the OP, recognizing the responsibility of CO2 polluters for persons displaced by 
anthropogenic climate change, the importance of supporting climate migrants is clear. 
Means must be found to restore their agency and dignity, as far as possible, in their home 
countries. When this fails and they are forced to migrate internationally, they must not 
only be accommodated but adequately integrated. Although in 2020 the UN Human 
Rights Committee issued a landmark ruling against “forcibly returning a person to a place 
where their life would be at risk due to the adverse effects of climate change,”52 at the 
45UNHCR, “Figures at a Glance,” Accessed 12 October 2021. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html
46Kanta Kumari Rigaud, et al., Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration, (Washington DC: The World Bank, 
2018). https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29461.
47Neelopal Adri and David Simon, “A Tale of Two Groups: Focusing on the Differential Vulnerability of ‘Climate-Induced’ 






52Adaena Sinclair-Blakemore, “Teitiota v New Zealand: A Step Forward on the Protection of Climate Refugees under 
International Human Rights Law?” Oxford Human Rights Hub, (January 28, 2020), Accessed 12 October 2021. https:// 
ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/teitiota-v-new-zealand-a-step-forward-in-the-protection-of-climate-refugees-under-international- 
human-rights-law/.
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time of writing international climate migrants are generally treated as economic migrants, 
lacking protections of refugee status. Clearly, a host of practical and political questions 
remain to be addressed for the imperative to support climate migrants to be fulfilled. 
These questions have not been high priorities for most governments that make up the 
UNFCCC.
It is difficult to grasp the magnitude of the organizational tasks pursuant to just 
mitigation, adaptation, and support for climate migrants. Although a substantial carbon 
tax could conceivably motivate largely decentralized reductions in CO2 emissions, transi-
tions to carbon neutral economies inevitably require enormous government 
management.53 Low-income countries that need greatly increased energy for their 
economies to develop need substantial technical support to avoid fossil fuels. While 
demands of mitigation are driven by energy technologies and tend to be technically 
consistent, demands of adaptation tend to be issue- and site-specific, and technically 
much more demanding overall. Most climate migrants, as noted above, are likely to be 
found where institutions are already weak. Given the responsibility of citizens and firms in 
advanced countries for CO2 pollution, in the OP these countries would be held respon-
sible for much more than the $100 billion annually that they have already committed 
(although not yet realized). Rational management of these funds would have to be 
centrally organized, with stronger institutions of international governance. Fair and 
effective implementation of mitigation, adaptation, and migrant support programs that 
enhance the agency of beneficiary populations would require both strong top-down 
management and strong local participation.54 Funds would generally need to be chan-
neled through developing country governments in ways that not only enhance their 
institutional capabilities, but also strengthen their accountability to their own people. The 
organization of program implementation would need to support both technical ration-
ality and participatory governance.
The progress of UNFCCC negotiations reflects growing awareness of the risks from 
climate change and the evolving articulation of national interests. We have noted that 
advanced countries have resisted legal responsibility for their CO2 pollution from the 
start. The original 1992 agreement states, “the developed country Parties should take the 
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof,” and suggests “the 
return by the end of the present decade [i.e., by 2000] to earlier levels of anthropogenic 
emissions of carbon dioxide,” and that the needs of developing countries that are 
“particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change . . . should be given full 
consideration.”55 It does not, however, specify particular obligations, and emissions 
continued to increase from 1992 through 2019.56 Khan et al. argue that it was not until 
2007 that developing countries made funding for adaptation a central demand in 
negotiations.57 Economic analyses of climate change from 1991 led by Nordhaus have 
indicated that burdens on future generations will generally be quite manageable, but 
53See e.g., Chloe Revill and Victoria Harris, “2020 The Climate Turning Point,” Accessed 12 October 2021. https:// 
mission2020.global/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2020-The-Climate-Turning-Point.pdf.
54See e.g., Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
55United Nations, 1992, 4, 6.
56Statistica, “Historical carbon dioxide emissions from global fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes from 1750 to 
2020,”: Accessed 12 October 2021. https://www.statista.com/statistics/264699/worldwide-co2-emissions/.
57Mizan Khan, et al., “Twenty-five Years of Adaptation Finance Through a Climate Justice Lens” Climatic Change 161 
(2020), 254–255. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-019-02563-x.
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from 2006 this has increasingly been contested by Stern. In 2008 Hansen et al. argued, “If 
humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed and 
to which life on Earth is adapted, paleoclimate evidence and ongoing climate change 
suggest that CO2 will need to be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm, 
but likely less than that,”58 but IPCC reports have generally indicated far less urgency.
Agents in the OP may represent people who are particularly vulnerable to climate 
change, such as members of future generations and marginal communities in developing 
countries. Considering the institutional momentum of CO2 emissions, feedback loops, 
and risks that even if of low likelihood are already catastrophic, they would find the 
present status of CO2 emissions already deeply unjust. Unsurprisingly, these interests are 
not well represented in UNFCCC negotiations. Moreover, principles stated, for example, in 
the 1992 Convention and the 2015 Paris Agreement, are better understood as aspirations 
of negotiating parties than as actual government commitments. Even formal commit-
ments are subject to national politics, as evidenced by the US government’s failure to 
promote its Nationally Determined Contribution from 2016 to 2020 under President 
Trump. The neglect of climate migrants in UNFCCC negotiations is particular evidence 
of the injustice of the process, and that prospects for climate justice depend, unsurpris-
ingly, on its being promoted by the people.
The OP for climate change allows us to articulate a rough ideal of institutions needed 
to fulfill responsibilities arising from CO2 pollution. We have noted the prominent role of 
the US Senate in blocking early mitigation efforts, but, as the Kantian conception of moral 
personality would lead us to expect, the Senate was only the tip of the institutional 
iceberg of resistance. The US Senate’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol was largely due to 
a multi-million dollar lobbying campaign by the fossil fuel industry and other prominent 
business interests, which was itself part of a systematic, decades-long campaign that 
succeeded greatly in promoting climate change denial among the American public and 
blocking climate change legislation by the US government. The lobbying campaign even 
managed to persuade US labor organizations to oppose the Kyoto treaty over concerns 
about job losses.59 The climate change denial campaign drew on the US tobacco indus-
try’s experience sowing misinformation on the carcinogenic properties of cigarettes and 
blocking regulation that would reduce their profits.60 Opposition from labor to the Kyoto 
Protocol and the tobacco industry’s legacy both illustrate the bulwark of institutional 
commitments, arising from prior struggles, that the movement for climate justice con-
fronts. Climate justice demands, as they say in economics, “nonmarginal” institutional 
changes that introduce a host of cross-cutting conflicts.
Kant insists that the authority of the moral law does not depend on our subjective 
acknowledgment of this law but on its rational force which originates in our own reason, 
even if this gets rationalized away by our self-interest.61 Contributions to CO2 pollution 
generate obligations to climate justice that we need to integrate with other obligations. 
The peculiar physics of climate change and the system of independent nation states 
58James Hansen, et al., “Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?” The Open Atmospheric Science Journal 2 
(2008): 217.
59Ronald C. Kramer, Carbon Criminals, Climate Crimes (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2020), 114–115.
60Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from 
Tobacco to Global Warming (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010).
61Paul Formosa, Kantian Ethics, Dignity and Perfection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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that we inhabit give these obligations a distinctive character and structure. 
Governments must be brought to support just global institutions for mitigation, adap-
tation, and climate migrants, but until such institutions are established, popular efforts 
also need to support just mitigation, adaptation, and care for climate migrants directly. 
This direct support can help to move governments toward upholding their responsi-
bilities while also addressing immediate needs. The central task here, however, is not to 
give personal service, but to build institutional infrastructure that can contribute to the 
ideal theory goal. Here strategy falls under partial compliance theory, with the veil of 
ignorance removed. Of course, most people cannot devote their lives to climate justice, 
and it is supererogatory – beyond the requirements of duty – to do so, although climate 
justice cannot be achieved unless significant numbers of persons do. Kantian ontology 
provides, however, a means of analyzing the ethical character of pathways to climate 
justice, which, integrated with institutional analysis, can inform strategy for climate 
justice.
From this ontology, four kinds of strategies emerge. Where narrow interests in CO2 
pollution dominate over principles, the aim is to undo the promotion of the narrow 
interests of the few who benefit from this and increase the promotion of the broader 
interests we all have in a healthy environment. Where forms of theoretical and/or practical 
reason inhibit recognition of responsibility for climate change, (forms that for a Kantian 
doctrine must be in error and for other doctrines may be in error), the aim is to find ways 
to speak to the person that allow them to see their responsibility. For people who 
recognize responsibility but whose theoretical and practical reason does not adequately 
articulate imperatives of climate justice, the aim is to enhance understanding and to offer 
opportunities for more effective action. And finally, for persons in institutional positions 
with influence over aspects of climate justice, the aim is to appeal to their personal and/or 
institutional principles and/or to alter their incentives to increase the priority or enhance 
the strategic character of theirs and their institution’s climate action, which may include 
enhancing understanding.
When reducing CO2 pollution directly conflicts with someone’s narrow interests, as, for 
example, with owners of petroleum firms, a person is likely, as Kant puts it, to “frame 
a morals to suit . . . [their] advantage,”62 to thereby avoid acknowledging responsibility for 
harms from promoting their interests, and this is likely also to distort their theoretical 
reason. Moreover, strategies to promote their interests, such as promoting climate change 
denial, can undermine others’ practical and/or theoretical reason. To the extent that the 
form of the modern corporation causes it to focus exclusively on profit-seeking, it is likely 
to contribute to institutionalizing such interests, such as via lobbying, until such time as 
the institutional environment shifts the balance of risk and reward sufficiently to vacate 
the interest. Since polluting interests are concentrated and well organized, they were able 
to gain early advantages in the struggle for climate justice, as illustrated by the transition 
by Exxon (later ExxonMobil), the world’s largest private petroleum firm, from contributing 
to the science63 of climate change in the 1970s to promoting climate change denial in the 
62Kant, ZeF, 8:372.
63Kramer, Carbon Criminals, Climate Crimes, 66–74.
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1990s and 2000s. Strategy for climate justice needs to counter proactive strategies of CO2 
polluting interests to protect their profits and it needs to remove or counteract the 
harmful interest, such as with carbon taxes and by shifting public opinion.
Someone may have no unusual interest in carbon pollution, but their theoretical and/ 
or practical reason may include commitments that make it difficult to engage with 
obligations to promote climate justice. Evidence suggests that climate change scepticism 
is “rooted in people’s core values and worldviews.”64 For example, some Christians 
committed to the literal truth of the Bible do not accept the science of evolution. Some 
may believe that God’s promise to Noah, that “never again shall there be a flood to lay 
waste the earth,”65 precludes significant sea level rise from climate change, or that God’s 
control of the climate system is not subject to significant human interference. Many 
Americans hold libertarian commitments and tend to consider government programs, 
particularly global government, generally harmful. In cases such as these it may be 
possible to introduce other, overriding commitments. As employees, for example, they 
may see following instructions for actions that in effect promote aspects of climate justice 
as their duty. If strategy requires their willing climate justice, one might present them with 
evidence of their responsibility for the matter in question, or the specific imperative for 
action, in terms consistent with some part of their practical reason, such as the obligation 
to care for God’s creation, as far as possible from within their worldview. Research 
suggests, for example, that challenging the perception that anti-climate change views 
are widely shared by others66 and the use of targeted “value-congruent” information67 
can be effective in changing people’s views about climate change. Alternatively, 
a strategy might be devised that does not require their support.
It is perhaps particularly common in advanced countries for people to be aware of 
climate change as problematic, and to feel some obligation, but to focus too narrowly, to 
do too little, or to make broad appeals that remain ineffectual in the face of organized 
interests. Our interpretation of climate change as a “wicked problem” emphasizes normal 
limitations of theoretical and practical reason in the face of the complexity of climate 
change and corresponding organizational challenges in promoting climate justice.
As the scientific community has become increasingly dismayed at prospects from 
climate change it has become common for scientific studies to analyze a particular 
system – ocean acidification and changes in ocean chemistry, or particularly extreme 
changes in the polar climate system – and to call for “urgent action.” With his influential 
1988 testimony to the US Congress and his significant support for the climate action 
group, 350.org, Hansen is among the most engaged of scientists. A 2017 paper aimed at 
non-scientists on which he is lead author, “Young people’s burden: requirement of 
negative CO2 emission,” reiterates his call for reducing atmospheric CO2 to 350 ppm, 
now requiring even more substantial CO2 removal from the atmosphere. The paper 
64Wouter Poortinga , “Uncertain Climate: An Investigation into Public Scepticism about Anthropogenic Climate Change.” 
Global Environmental Change 21, no. 3 (2011): 1015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.03.001.
65Bible Hub, “Genesis 9:11” Accessed 12 October 2021. https://biblehub.com/genesis/9-11.htm.
66Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Nicolas Fay, and Gilles E. Gignac, “Science by Social Media: Attitudes towards 
Climate Change Are Mediated by Perceived Social Consensus,” Memory & Cognition 47, no. 8 (2019): 1445. https://doi. 
org/10.3758/s13421-019-00948-y.
67Thomas Graham and Wokje Abrahamse, “Communicating the Climate Impacts of Meat Consumption: The Effect of 
Values and Message Framing,” Global Environmental Change 44 (2017): 98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.03. 
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analyzes the danger without such a reduction that “slow feedbacks are activated to 
a degree that continuing climate change will be out of humanity’s control.”68 Finding 
that “the world has already overshot appropriate [greenhouse gas] and global tempera-
ture,” it describes encouraging local efforts to reduce CO2 emissions but notes that they 
are undermined “without effective global policies.” It argues that “[t]here is no time to 
delay . . . if large fossil fuel emissions are allowed to continue . . . the burden on young 
people and on future generations may become too heavy to bear,”69 yet it warns that the 
“inertia of the climate system” may allow harms “to build up before broad public concern 
awakens.”70
The paper describes scientifically plausible means that could bring atmospheric CO2 
back down to 350 ppm, but from a political and organizational perspective these means 
are, as social scientists would say, highly implausible. The articulation of this goal can be 
seen as an instance of the propensity of practical reason to find solutions for the problems 
with which it presents itself from analytic materials at hand. Similarly, the climate change- 
aware public often finds solutions in actions to reduce their own carbon footprints, such 
as by recycling, buying an EV, or reducing meat consumption. They may join demonstra-
tions or become members of environmental organizations, and of course all these actions 
tend to be helpful. But insofar as practical reason and the strategy it informs are not 
coherently grounded in ideal theory and partial compliance theory, action for climate 
justice is likely to be less effective. Many environmental organizations promote political 
reforms consistent with climate justice, but as membership-based organizations their 
strategic options tend to be constrained by limitations in their members’ practical reason 
and means of influence. Organization for climate justice in mitigation, adaptation, and 
support for climate migrants calls for international frames of reference quite beyond most 
environmental organizations’ present strategic plans.
When reforms are carried out in unjust social contexts, they are likely to be refracted 
by, and potentially to exacerbate, prior injustices. Indeed, it is often the least advantaged 
members of a society that bear the majority of the harms associated with poor environ-
mental conditions.71 In California, the first US state to legislate reductions in CO2 emis-
sions, as elsewhere, low-income communities of color already bore the brunt of prior 
pollution and were also disproportionately harmed by heat waves, droughts and wildfires 
exacerbated by climate change.72 When the state government proposed a Global 
Warming Solutions Act centered on market-based approaches, a state-wide environmen-
tal justice coalition protested:
Carbon trading is undemocratic because it allows entrenched polluters, market designers, 
and commodity traders to determine whether and where to reduce greenhouse gasses and 
co-pollutant emissions without allowing impacted communities or governments to partici-
pate in those decisions.73
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Environmental justice groups based in the Latino community initially failed to build 
significant local participation into the Act. After four years of lobbying, however, they 
secured the establishment of the country’s first Climate Change Community Benefits 
Fund. It invests some revenues from the state’s cap-and-trade system in California’s 
communities most affected by air pollution, supporting local solutions that reduce local 
pollution and increase local employment.74 This case serves as a positive example of 
embedding social justice concerns in climate change policy while also illustrating limita-
tions of a conception of environmental justice not grounded in an appropriate OP.
It is generally appropriate to understand government officials, managers of firms, and 
employees of other organizations as representing their organization’s principles and 
interests with some scope for personal discretion. Representatives of advanced countries 
to the UNFCCC, for example, are not at liberty to commit their home country to welcom-
ing climate migrants without authorization. This condition provides an obvious basis for 
designing strategy for climate justice; in this context the political weakness of future 
generations and of communities most vulnerable to climate change helps to explain the 
scale of popular participation needed to secure climate justice.
Strategy for climate justice, then, starts from ideal theory, from the perspective of the 
climate change OP, articulating overall institutional features of climate justice. This offers 
a vantage point from which the distance of present institutions from climate justice can 
be assessed by way of historical institutional analysis. Kantian moral ontology and its 
account of the various forms of rationality provides a framework for identifying the kinds 
of strategies that may be needed and sets the stage for strategic planning, including 
helping to identify and correct failures of reason. This can include failures of theoretical 
reason, such as noting unjustified false beliefs about climate change, its causes and 
effective solutions; failures of instrumental reason, such as the gap between people’s or 
organization’s stated ends and the insufficient means they have willed toward achieving 
those ends; failures of prudential reason, such as the failure to appreciate the negative 
impacts climate change will have on their own well-being and the well-being of those 
they care about; and failures of moral reason, such as the failure to recognize their moral 
and justice-based obligations in regards to climate change.
The present exercise helps to clarify the role and limits of ideal theory, and hence the 
tasks Rawls leaves to others, and this provides a basis for responding to some of Rawls’s 
critics. Sen, for example, critiques Rawls as the leading contemporary proponent of 
a “transcendental institutionalist” approach to political philosophy that seeks to identify 
“just institutional arrangements for a society,”75 an approach in which he includes 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, as well as Dworkin, Gauthier and Nozick. The 
approach is transcendental in trying “only to identify social characteristics that cannot 
be transcended in terms of justice,” rather than considering how society could be made 
less unjust, and institutionalist in concentrating “primarily on getting the institutions 
right, and it is not directly focused on the actual societies that would ultimately 
emerge.”76 With Rawls, Sen argues, “[t]he characterization of perfectly just institutions 
has become the central exercise in the modern theories of justice,” rather than 
74Ibid., 116.
75Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 5.
76Ibid., 6.
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investigating “realization-based comparisons that focus on the advancement or retreat of 
justice,” and this “balance of emphasis . . . will require a radical change in the formulation 
of the theory of justice.”77
Recognizing the limited role of ideal theory in TJ, to identify principles that define the 
fundamental terms of association free and rational persons would accept in an initial 
position of equality, allows an immediate concession to Sen. While Rawls notes the 
importance of partial compliance theory, he fails to place sufficient emphasis on the 
need to devise political strategy in a way that, as Sen proposes, takes account of likely 
realizations. We need to recognize that the OP of TJ is custom designed to identify 
principles of justice for the basic structure of a reasonably well-off constitutional democ-
racy. This is the unit of cooperation that, for its citizens, is normally most significant to 
their life prospects. Rawls identifies maximizing equal liberties as his first principle of 
justice because freedoms of speech, religion, political participation, and so on, are so 
critical. The equal opportunity and economic democracy of his second principle are 
needed to ensure the fair value of the liberties. Together, the two principles secure as 
best we might the opportunity for citizens’ full exercise of their reasonable and rational 
powers, and hence the democratic tradition’s aspirations to freedom and equality. As with 
our OP for climate justice, the OP of TJ allows for the identification of a rough outline of 
a set of just institutions that could serve as the object of political strategy, an object that, 
although not very distinct, is distinct enough as a starting point, such as for a political 
party or movement. It does not address all the questions of justice that Sen raises, but it 
does provide a basis for ordering incremental improvements. For example, the equal 
opportunity principle clearly tells us that (in many nations) we are greatly underfunding 
the education of less privileged groups and this public funding needs to be increased to 
better ensure equal outcomes for similarly talented citizens. This gives us clear direction 
for enacting incremental justice improvements in this regard.
While Sen’s conception of justice is more cosmopolitan but less nationally ambitious 
than Rawls’s, Mouffe critiques Rawls on the way to articulating a basis for radical demo-
cratic citizenship. Like Sen, she argues that the selection of principles by agents in the OP 
of TJ is not as determinate as Rawls supposes78 and, also like Sen, she fails to appreciate 
the limits of Rawls’s project. Mouffe’s central concern with Rawls is that his conception of 
moral personality, framed in abstract moral philosophy, is inadequately political, empha-
sizing rights but not obligations, and failing to engage the person in history. By using 
a mode of reasoning specific to moral discourse, “conflicts, antagonisms, relations of 
power, forms of subordination and repression simply disappear” . . . “as well as the values 
that can be realized in collective action.”79 Mouffe’s conception of the political, drawn 
from Carl Schmitt, emphasizes “the constitutive role of antagonism in social life,” whereby 
political identity is always defined in a friend/enemy relation, in “the creation of a ’we’ by 
the delimitation of a ‘them.’”80 She argues for a radical democratic interpretation of liberty 
and equality that emphasizes
77Ibid., 8–9.
78Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), 52.
79Chantal Mouffe, “Rawls: Political Philosophy Without Politics,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 13, no. 2 (1987): 113, 120.
80Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 2.
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the numerous social relations where relations of domination exist and must be challenged . . . 
The creation of political identities as radical democratic citizens depends therefore on 
a collective form of identification among the democratic demands found in a variety of 
movements: women, workers, black, gay, ecological, as well as in several other ‘new social 
movements’.81
Mouffe argues that Rawls “seems to believe that disagreements only concern religious 
and philosophical questions and that by avoiding [rival claims and conflicting interests] it 
is possible to reach a consensus on the way the basic institutions of society should be 
organized.”82
Rawls can only be understood to imagine, however, that his principles of justice could 
be implemented in actual constitutions through the democratic process. The limited aim 
of his theory is to provide principles that could plausibly serve as the basis for a “well- 
ordered” society, a concept he recognizes to be “highly idealized.”83 Mouffe projects the 
constraints of deliberations in ideal theory onto the politics of non-ideal theory that Rawls 
seldom addresses but must be taken to assume. In order to satisfy his principles’ demands 
for liberty and equality, the oppression of women, workers, Blacks, and gays, among 
others, and proper care for the environment must be addressed. Where Rawls approaches 
this by way of the institutions needed to fulfil his principles, Mouffe aims to identify 
conditions for solidarity among oppressed groups that can support a “radical democratic 
hegemony.”84 Their projects are organized around different materials: the shared princi-
ples that constitute institutions as ends for Rawls, and the individual principles that 
constitute identity (but that nevertheless are still socially constructed) as means for 
Mouffe. While Rawls does not address strategy, it seems that Mouffe’s radical democratic 
politics could appear on a menu of options he might endorse. While Rawls acknowledges 
that the “problems of partial compliance theory are the pressing and urgent matter . . . 
that we are faced with in everyday life,”85 he fails to grapple with these problems and the 
practical means of solving them in enough detail, and only focuses on a theory of 
punishment and civil disobedience when discussing partial compliance theory.86 He 
thereby fails to engage with (or, rather, leaves to others the work of) developing the 
more positive and organizational aspects of a partial compliance theory that his own 
theory calls for and that are needed to deal with the positive and incremental achieve-
ment of social and climate justice.
In conclusion, we have seen that a critical Rawlsian political theory that moves beyond 
his own cases, as we illustrate with climate justice, starts from an appropriately configured 
OP to analyze the problem at hand and to identify a rough political target of just 
institutions. Climate justice, for instance, requires much stronger international institutions 
for mitigation, adaptation, and to support climate migrants with defenses against political 
interference from “donor” and recipient governments. To move beyond ideal theory, 
however, we do not simply draw a line from the present to the just ideal. We also need 
to understand configurations of principles and interests that stand in the way, as we 
81Ibid., 70.
82Ibid., 50.
83Rawls, Political Liberalism, 35.
84Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 73.
85Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 8.
86E.g., ibid., 309.
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illustrate, through historical institutional analysis. We find that governments are not 
reliable representatives of individual persons (including future persons) who are the 
proper subjects of climate justice, which helps to explain both the inadequate progress 
of UNFCCC negotiations and their particular neglect of climate migrants. Rawlsian moral 
ontology, drawn from Kant, helps to identify the nature of the opposition and the kinds of 
strategies needed, in our case to overcome resistance from carbon interests, but also to 
address limitations of theoretical and practical reason that may not fit Mouffe’s friend/ 
enemy relation. Strategies may aim to help people acknowledge responsibilities that they 
have been unable to grasp, or to frame intentions in terms that can contribute to more 
effective action.
A complete partial compliance theory that supports political strategy requires a theory 
of institutions beyond the scope of the present paper. We can see that strategy for climate 
justice generally needs to be framed in relation to the international arena, a significant 
change for most environmental organizations. Considering the structural disempower-
ment of the more severe victims of the climate crisis, although empowerment of the 
oppressed remains significant, political organization needs to focus significantly on 
mobilizing more effective action by people who endorse the obligation to climate justice. 
The scale of popular effort and the degree of institutional sophistication that are needed 
are stunning, but the consequences of failure are too great to accept as inevitable.
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